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LES CONDITIONS DU BONHEUR. By Paul Souriau, Professor at the University of Nancy. Paris: Armand Colin, 1908. Pp. 348.

In writing this book, the object of which he states to be the determination of the actual conditions of happiness, Professor Souriau seems to have been moved by a desire to make people happier. Not that he does not also attach a scientific value to his task. The question, What are the main causes of human happiness? can only be answered by an inquiry into facts; and he thinks this inquiry important from the point of view of the discovery of truth, quite apart from any didactic value that it may have. Still, its main interest for him evidently lies in the influence which, in his opinion, it is likely to have on our happiness. It is therefore unfortunate that he does not explain clearly what form this influence can take.

As to certain general conditions of happiness, such as bodily health and money, it seems superfluous to write a book urging the advantage of pursuing them, since nearly everybody desires to be rich and healthy. There are, however, other things, which are often regarded as essential to happiness, and for which it does seem useful to urge people to strive. The desire to do one's duty, for instance, is probably neither so strong nor so universal as the desire for health and money; so that,—since it may be argued that the world would be happier if more people did their duty,—some discussion of moral obligations may plausibly be held to fall within the scope of a treatise on the art of happiness. Accordingly we find that much of Professor Souriau's book is occupied with describing the general lines of conduct which various classes of people ought to pursue. Marriages, as a general rule, ought not to be based solely on considerations of fortune; husbands and wives ought to be mutually forbearing; married people ought not unduly to restrict the number of their children, though they ought not to have too many; parents ought to bring up their children well, and children ought to treat their parents with consideration; society ought to aim at a juster distribution of wealth; the rich ought to be public spirited and not to live in selfish luxury: these are samples of the views which Professor Souriau advocates at some length. These views, it will be seen, are neither new nor startling: and there can be little doubt that Professor Souriau

is right in saying that people ought, as a rule, to act in the ways that he describes. His object, however, is not merely to encourage the observance of such rules by pointing them out: his hope seems rather to be that, by explaining their connection with happiness, he will persuade people to observe them more generally, and that thereby he will increase the total sum of happiness. Is this hope justified? In the first place, he indicates no way of deciding whether in particular cases the general rule ought to be followed or not; so that, even if increase of happiness and right conduct always coincided, no one could tell from this book whether in a particular case he ought to do what would at the same time make him most happy. Again, Professor Souriau says emphatically that happiness and duty do not universally coincide: the wicked, he thinks, do sometimes flourish; so that, if anyone already knows what he ought to do, the remarks about happiness contained in this book will not influence his action so long as there is no means of ascertaining whether the performance of his duty will cause an increase of happiness. It thus seems unlikely that Professor Souriau's determination of the conditions of happiness should have the effect which he expects.

The reason why he nevertheless regards his treatise as a guide to happiness is not far to seek. It lies in his constant tendency to identify 'true' happiness with morality. He does, it is true, begin by defining happiness as the excess of pleasures (mental and physical) over pains: when he speaks of a happy man, he is going to mean, he tells us, simply a man in whose life there is, on the whole, more pleasure than pain. But gradually, under the pressure of difficulties, he drifts into a different definition. Such questions, for instance, arise as whether a civilized man is generally more happy than a savage, or a savage than an animal,—questions which, if by 'happier' we mean simply 'enjoying more pleasure,' it certainly seems very difficult to answer in the absence of trustworthy data for comparing, in respect of amount and intensity of pleasure, the life (say) of the average savage with that of the average European. But if we give a wider meaning to the word 'happier,' it does seem plausible to suppose that these questions can be answered without collecting a mass of complicated facts. And this is what Professor Souriau does. He urges that there is some necessary connection between increase of pleasure and increase of activity.

This connection (though not precisely defined) appears to be such that the more intense and the more varied an individual's activities, the greater (whether in quantity, or intensity, or both, is not clear) can be said to be his 'true' pleasure and his 'true' happiness. It follows that civilized men, who have developed moral activities over and above the physical and mental activities which they share with savages and animals, have a surplus of happiness over that enjoyed by creatures lower in the scale. Now it may be admitted that a definition of happiness as the full development of all normal activities, physical, mental and moral, might to some extent render probable this optimistic conclusion. If 'to be happy' means 'to develop moral and other activities in a high degree,' it might conceivably follow that people who are much concerned about morality are happier (*ceteris paribus*) than those who are not; and in that case Professor Souriau might be justified in thinking that by recommending morality he was showing the way to happiness. But, as it is, no inference from moral activity to happiness is open to him, because (to say nothing of his admission that the righteous are not always happy) his original definition of happiness as excess of pleasures over pains contradicts the premiss required for any such inference: if a happy life is *defined* as one in which pleasure predominates, it cannot also be *defined* as one of the greatest and most varied activity possible. The two definitions might be reconciled by proving a universal connection between pleasure and *all* forms of activity; but he does not attempt this proof, which indeed could not be effected without abandoning the view that duty is sometimes unpleasant.

It remains to say a word as to Professor Souriau's claim that his results are based on a laborious investigation of facts. His object is to 'determine the conditions' of human happiness,—an ambiguous phrase which would seem to include at least an enumeration of the principal things which are necessary to happiness, and some comparison of them in respect of the degree in which they are necessary. Here our main criticism must be that he obtains no definite results at all except such as are obvious truisms. He makes indeed some parade of scientific method; but it is only parade: he is not really put to any great pains to discover that much happiness is caused by bodily health, a well-balanced mind, marriage, family ties, sufficient money, belief in religion, and so forth. It is plain enough that these

things are among the causes of most of the happiness in the world; and it is equally plain that some of them also cause some unhappiness. Professor Souriau makes no serious effort to estimate the proportion which the amount of happiness thus caused bears to that of the unhappiness, nor does he consider whether any one of these causes is more necessary as a condition of happiness than the others. To solve these or any other of the numerous problems which the phrase 'the conditions of happiness' at once suggests, it would be essential in the first place to obtain some clear idea as to the difference which different intensities of pleasure make to the total amounts of happiness in which they occur. But Professor Souriau scarcely notices the difficulties connected with intensity of pleasure, and is far from seeing how important is the place which those difficulties must occupy in any theory of happiness.

S. WATERLOW.

Rye, England.

SOCIAL ORGANIZATION: A Study of the Larger Mind. By Charles Horton Cooley. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1909. Pp. xviii, 426.

Those whose estimate of sociology has been formed largely through their knowledge of Herbert Spencer and other writers of his school, will find a pleasant surprise in this book. The older sociology was physical and even materialistic. The new sociology is frankly dependent upon psychology. It is, indeed, frequently not to be distinguished from psychology except in its point of view, which is not that of individual consciousness, but that of the collective life. Among the leaders of this new or psychological sociology in this country is Professor Cooley, of the University of Michigan, whose "Human Nature and the Social Order," and the volume we are about to consider may be taken as fairly representative of the new school. Those who have learned to expect something worth while through reading his former work, will be in no way disappointed in this, his latest production.

The volume before us is in no sense a formal text on the